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For the appellate lawyer, bridging the gap between theoretical
foundation and practical application is an important challenge. An
attorney who is unable to bring these two notions together is only
partially effective as an advocate. Without a firm theoretical foun-
dation that embraces both the law and policy that underlie the law-
yer's argument, the substance of the appellate advocate's position
will not persuade the court effectively. Similarly, without having
mastered the practical side of appellate advocacy, the lawyer will
be ineffective in communicating the substance of the argument
altogether.
As part of bridging the gap between this theoretical foundation
and practical application of appellate law, an advocate who ven-
tures into this area of practice should be mindful both of the parti-
culars of the case as they relate to the interests of the client as well
* St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas.
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
as how a resolution of the controversy will affect the community.
Bridging this gap helps the attorney advance the interests of the
client in light of terms that reflect society's interests. In other
words, an appellate practitioner does not operate in a vacuum with
the judge and parties as the only principles involved in the deci-
sion. Indeed, in terms of the impact on society as a whole, appel-
late attorneys are perhaps the most important of all legal
specialists, particularly in light of the importance our society places
on the development of the common law and stare decisis.
After all, such "judge-made law" plays a vital role in the Ameri-
can legal system. This law is not the result of abstract rule making
in a legislative setting; instead, such law is the result of court deci-
sions resolving real disputes between real parties. To be sure, the
very arguments appellate attorneys make on behalf of their clients
become woven into the fabric of the common law, thus affecting all
of society. Some of the most fundamental doctrines of our legal
system-those we learned in the first year of law school from cases
such as Marbury v. Madison,' Brown v. Board of Education,2 Pal-
sgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. ,' Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,4
and Hadley v. Baxendale 5-are a direct result of an attorney's ar-
guments to an appellate court. If not for attorneys who urged
courts to extend the law in a certain manner to a particular set of
facts, these cases-and the underlying precepts that they repre-
sent-would never have reached our law books.
Although the advocate often faces the difficult challenge of help-
ing the court understand the client's interests in terms of society's
interests, the appellate judge faces an even more formidable task.
When deciding the outcome of a case on appeal, the judge does not
simply interpret the law in question. Rather, the judge considers
the decision's impact on existing precedent and society as a whole,
as well as whether a particular result will render justice between
the parties who are in conflict. The existence of these different-
and possibly disparate-concerns does not facilitate simple resolu-
tion of cases at the appellate level. One need not search prior deci-
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
4. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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sions for long before finding a case in which a person's side of a
controversy seemed compelling or invoked great sympathy, but be-
cause of the potential adverse impact on society of a ruling based
on equitable principles alone, the case was decided against that
person.6 One often finds that such decisions are based either on a
judge's reluctance to establish a doctrine that, although beneficial
to a party in one instance, would be detrimental to society as a
whole, or on a judge's reluctance to disrupt a coherent body of
established case law by injecting into it an anomalous holding.7
Another gap that attorneys must bridge lies primarily in the
realm of lawyers who are not specialists in appellate law. In the
age of legal specialization, many attorneys are becoming estab-
lished in particular areas of the law. The unfortunate result of this
specialization is that it serves to exclude these attorneys from other
areas of law, including an awareness of the appellate process.
Thus, the challenge to non-appellate lawyers emerges from the gap
between their specialization and the broader practice of appellate
law. Indeed, many attorneys wince at the thought of appearing
before any judge, especially an appellate judge. Similarly, many
who have established themselves as capable trial attorneys might
attempt to isolate themselves from the intricacies of appellate law,
either figuring that only a small portion of their practice will ever
be spent in an appellate setting or resorting to an appellate special-
ist when actually faced with the need. Yet, attorneys who avoid an
6. See, e.g., T.R. v. Adoption Servs., 724 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that although the court was sympathetic to a mother who had petitioned to set
aside the consent to her child's adoption, the court must overrule the motion absent evi-
dence of fraud or duress); Solowy v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 561 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Mich.
1997) (noting that although the court is sympathetic to those whose claims become time
barred by the arbitrariness of the statute of limitations, such arbitrariness is an essential
element of that statute).
7. See, e.g., Downie v. Kent Prods., Inc., 362 N.W.2d 605, 613 (Mich. 1984) (holding
that despite the persuasive arguments to incorporate notions of comparative negligence in
the workers' compensation arena, to which the court was sympathetic, accepting those ar-
guments would not be prudent because they would disrupt the stability and simplicity of
existing law); Adoption Servs., 724 So. 2d at 1237 (stating that despite the appellant's sym-
pathetic position in her motion to set aside the consent to her child's adoption, "if consents
to adoption were freely made voidable, the stability of adoptive families and the institution
of adoption itself would be threatened"); Trovillion v. Countrywide Funding Corp., 910
S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that were the court considering the issue
presented as a case of first impression, it might well agree with the plaintiff's sympathetic
position; however, because established precedent holds otherwise, "it is . . . prudent to
follow other long established appellate precedent").
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awareness of the appellate implications that their client's issues
present actually ignore the importance that appellate law plays in
the entire litigation process. After all, appellate courts are the final
arbiters of legal disputes in our society, and anyone familiar with
the appellate process recognizes how quickly one's fate can change
once their dispute reaches the appellate level. Most importantly,
however, is that the appeals process is entirely dependent upon the
earlier phases of litigation: for example, was error preserved at
trial?8
Mindful of the many phases of client representation that can
span years, or even decades, the analogy of a large-scale construc-
tion project is helpful. In erecting any structure, several different
tradesmen are employed; different specialists are involved in pre-
paring the site, laying the foundation, and erecting the frame, for
example. Other subcontractors install a structure's vital electrical,
plumbing, and cooling systems. In the end, finishing touches
render the structure complete and ready for occupation. Repre-
senting a client can be viewed in a similar manner. When a client
seeks the advice of an attorney to partake in some endeavor, such
as forming a business, the client will often seek a specialist in that
area, such as a corporate attorney. With the burgeoning business
underway, the client might seek advice in matters related to the
business, perhaps by consulting attorneys who specialize in labor,
immigration, or tax. If a dispute arises, the client may seek help in
mediating the problem. Ultimately, the client may need help from
litigation counsel in proceeding to trial. Either party might choose
to appeal the trial court's judgment, thus requiring assistance at the
appellate stage.
In our construction analogy, the project would not have suc-
ceeded if each specialist viewed himself in isolation. Rather, the
undertaking was successful because each subcontractor was mind-
ful of his role as an integral part of a cooperative undertaking. For
instance, the tradesmen engaged in the final stages of the project
would have experienced difficulty in completing their tasks if mis-
takes occurred at earlier phases. If the masons had laid a poor
8. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) (providing that for a complaint to be reviewed at the
appellate level, the record must reflect that the complaint was brought to the trial court's




foundation, then the structural tradesmen would have failed in
completing their tasks. Likewise, those responsible for installing
the drywall would have encountered difficulty if a poor structure
existed.
The appellate advocate experiences similar challenges. An advo-
cate can only be effective if the proper groundwork was laid in the
preceding stages. Hence, all attorneys-not just appellate special-
ists-should view themselves not merely as advocates of their cli-
ents' interests in one isolated stage of the representation, but as
part of a cooperative effort in the entire representation of their
clients. Accordingly, all attorneys, regardless of what stage they
represent the client, must focus not only on the immediate task at
hand, but also on the end result of their clients' endeavors. In
short, attorneys must have a sufficient understanding of the appel-
late process and the intricacies of appellate law before they can
effectively advocate for their clients' interests.
The most obvious example of the importance of this understand-
ing is the attorney who handles the case both before and during
trial. The attorney who represents a client in the early stages of
litigation must be familiar with appellate law in order to properly
plead the case, conduct discovery, and properly use the pretrial dis-
position techniques, such as summary judgment. Likewise, counsel
at trial faces a two-pronged task: striving to be persuasive in the
immediate setting and remembering that an effective appeal de-
pends upon proper preservation of error. Unless the litigator has
familiarized herself with the intricacies of appellate law, she may
inadvertently waive any error the appellate lawyer could complain
of, and thus, leave the client without meaningful grounds for un-
dertaking an appeal.
The point of this discussion is that all attorneys should seek to
bridge the gaps that exist in their practices in order to be the best
advocates possible. When each of us began our legal career in the
first year of law school, we were exposed to the fruit of the appeals
process in virtually every class. By reading appellate opinions, we
slowly learned the doctrines that serve as the underpinnings to our
legal system. In doing so, we learned that there was much more to
a case than its holding. Our professors urged us to dig deeper into
the opinion and challenged us to inquire whether such a holding
was the correct result. We learned to ask whether we would be
satisfied in extending the court's decision to hypothetical situa-
1999]
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
tions. Whether as a seasoned appellate advocate, or as an attorney
who practices outside the realm of appellate law, perhaps every
attorney could benefit by revisiting the first year of law school in a
metaphorical sense. In doing so, an attorney will begin to fill the
gaps that exist not only in her practice, but in her client's case as
well.
This Symposium provides the appellate specialist and non-appel-
late attorney alike with a groundwork to begin bridging these gaps
by discerning fundamental issues that are central to each client's
case. The Symposium addresses not only the art of appellate advo-
cacy, but the groundwork that must be laid months-perhaps
years-before an appeal. Contained herein, and in the materials
that accompanied the conference component of this Symposium,
are materials prepared by some of the leading appellate practition-
ers and judges in the State of Texas. Those who have contributed
to this Symposium-the students, attorneys, and judges who have
helped bridge the gap today-intend for all participants to benefit
from these materials and hope that all attorneys will continue to
appreciate the importance of the appellate process in our legal sys-
tem's dispute resolution process.
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